A blog about Arbitration law, by Stephen Ware, a law professor at KU, in Lawrence, Kansas.
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Showing posts with label federal preemption. Show all posts
Showing posts with label federal preemption. Show all posts
Sunday, March 31, 2019
Kentucky Revives Enforceability of Employment Arbitration
Kentucky's governor recently signed a bill enabling employers to require an employee or person seeking employment to execute an agreement for arbitration as a condition or precondition of employment. This legislation overrules the Kentucky Supreme Court decision in Northern Kentucky Area Development District v. Danielle Snyder which relied on a Kentucky statute forbidding any “employer
[from requiring] as a condition or precondition of employment that any employee
or person seeking employment waive, arbitrate, or otherwise diminish any
existing or future claim, right, or benefit to which the employee or person
seeking employment would otherwise be entitled.” KSA 336.700(2). The Kentucky Supreme Court ruled the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA)
did not preempt the Kentucky statute because, instead of targeting arbitration
specifically, the KSA 336.700(2) “is a law
that prohibits employers from firing or failing to hire on the condition that
the employee or prospective employee waive all existing rights that employee
would otherwise have against the employer.”
Saturday, October 27, 2018
Kentucky’s Non-Enforcement of Employment Arbitration Agreement Preempted by Federal Arbitration Act?
The Kentucky Supreme Court unanimously refused
to enforce an agreement conditioning
employment on an agreement to arbitrate. Kentucky Statute 336.700(2) “prohibits
employers from conditioning employment on an existing employee’s or prospective
employee’s agreement to ‘waive, arbitrate, or otherwise diminish any existing
or future claim, right, or benefit to which the employee or person seeking
employment would otherwise be entitled . . . .’ ”, according to Northern Kentucky Area
Development District v. Danielle Snyder
Several
commentators have observed conflict between this Kentucky Supreme Court ruling,
and the U.S. Supreme Court’s broad holding on Federal Arbitration Act (FAA)
preemption of such anti-arbitration state law:
Jackson
Lewis PC said “[t]he
Kentucky Supreme Court’s opinion appears to be at odds with recent U.S. Supreme
Court rulings on FAA preemption of state laws that treat arbitration agreements
differently than other contracts, see, e.g., Kindred Nursing Centers
Lmtd P’ship v. Clark, 137 S. Ct. 368 (2016).”
Vorys Sater Seymour and
Pease LLP said “[i]t seems difficult to reconcile the Snyder decision
with the United States Supreme Court’s 2018 decision in Epic Systems
Corp. v. Lewis … that expressly upheld mandatory arbitration
agreements or its 2017 decision in Kindred Nursing Centers v. Clark that
prohibits rules that single out arbitration for unfavorable treatment.”
Stoll
Keenon Ogden PLLC said “[i]mportantly, the Supreme Court of Kentucky’s
decision appears to conflict with recent U.S. Supreme Court precedent upholding
the FAA’s broad preemptive effect. See, e.g., Kindred Nursing Centers Ltd.
Partnership v. Clark, 137 S.Ct. 1421 (2017).”
I commented on Epic Systems here
and on Kindred Nursing here.
Kindred Nursing also involved a decision by Kentucky’s Supreme Court.
Tuesday, September 18, 2018
California Supreme Court Vacates Arbitration Award and Refuses to Enforce Arbitration Clause in Void Contract
The California
Supreme Court held that a law firm’s failure to disclose to the firm’s
client the firm’s conflict of interest violated Rules of Professional Conduct
and thus rendered the firm’s engagement agreement with its client, including
the arbitration clause, unenforceable in its entirety.
This decision is interesting for:
- applying state arbitration law rather than the Federal Arbitration Act;
- vacating an arbitration award on the merits; and
- not applying the separability doctrine of Prima Paint v. Flood & Conklin (1967) 388 U.S. 395.
On the first of these topics, the court said: “the parties’
agreement calls for application of California law, including the CAA, and both
parties agree that the CAA governs. This case thus presents no question concerning application of the Federal
Arbitration Act, 9 United States Code section 1 et seq. (See Volt Info.
Sciences v. Leland Stanford Jr. U. (1989) 489 U.S. 468, 470; Cronus Investments, Inc. v.
Concierge Services (2005) 35 Cal.4th 376, 387.)”
On the second, the court said: a court may vacate an
arbitration award when “[t]he arbitrators exceeded their powers and the award
cannot be corrected without affecting the merits of the
decision upon the controversy submitted.” (Code Civ. Proc.,
§ 1286.2, subd. (a)(4) (section 1286.2(a)(4)).) And: “the merits of an arbitral
award are not generally subject to judicial review, but ... “the rules which
give finality to the arbitrator’s determination of ordinary questions of fact
or of law are inapplicable where the issue of illegality of the entire
transaction is raised in a proceeding for the enforcement of the arbitrator’s
award.”
Law 360 discusses
the case
Tuesday, May 16, 2017
Supreme Court: Federal Arbitration Law Preempts State Law on Nursing Home Power of Attorney
By a 7-1 vote, the U.S. Supreme Court reversed a Kentucky Supreme Court decision refusing to enforce nursing-home arbitration agreements entered into by agents with power of attorney on behalf of their principals.
The Kentucky Supreme Court "fails to put arbitration agreements on an equal plane with other contracts," according to the opinion, authored by Justice Elana Kagan. "By requiring an explicit statement before an agent can relinquish her principal’s right to go to court and receive a jury trial, the court did exactly what this Court has barred: adopt a legal rule hinging on the primary characteristic of an arbitration agreement."
Commentary by University of North Carolina law professor Mark Weidemaier
The Hill coverage
SCOTUS blog coverage
The Kentucky Supreme Court "fails to put arbitration agreements on an equal plane with other contracts," according to the opinion, authored by Justice Elana Kagan. "By requiring an explicit statement before an agent can relinquish her principal’s right to go to court and receive a jury trial, the court did exactly what this Court has barred: adopt a legal rule hinging on the primary characteristic of an arbitration agreement."
Commentary by University of North Carolina law professor Mark Weidemaier
The Hill coverage
SCOTUS blog coverage
Monday, December 14, 2015
Supreme Court Rules for DirectTV in Class Arbitration Case
The full text of DIRECTV, INC. v. IMBURGIA ET AL addresses whether a California choice of law clause chose California law on arbitral class waivers over federal law on them.
Commentary on the case by Georgetown Law professor Greg Klass says "all the opinion says is that when a state court is messing around with preempted state law, it should be really, really clear that it understands that in the end federal law always wins"
Commentary on the case by Georgetown Law professor Greg Klass says "all the opinion says is that when a state court is messing around with preempted state law, it should be really, really clear that it understands that in the end federal law always wins"
Wednesday, November 27, 2013
Federal Arbitration Act Preemption
Ohio State law professor Sarah Rudolph Cole is an experienced, careful, and well-balanced scholar of arbitration law. Her recent article discusses one of the most important topics in arbitration law, FAA preemption of state law. She points out that the Supreme Court’s Stolt-Nielsen (2010) and Concepcion (2011) decisions permit preemption of state law in areas the FAA does not address.
Saturday, October 5, 2013
Contractual Arbitration, Mandatory Arbitration and State Constitutional Jury-Trial Rights
Contractual Arbitration, Mandatory Arbitration and State Constitutional Jury-Trial Rights
This Article discusses the relationship between the Federal Arbitration Act and state constitutional jury-trial rights.
This Article discusses the relationship between the Federal Arbitration Act and state constitutional jury-trial rights.
Saturday, September 28, 2013
Privatizing Law Through Arbitration
Default Rules from Mandatory Rules: Privatizing Law Through Arbitration
This Article considers the extent to which the creation of law has been privatized through arbitration. It suggests that, under Supreme Court cases and other current legal doctrine, vast areas of law are privatizable and that this degree of privatization is possible only through arbitration. The implications of this point are separated along the familiar line between mandatory rules of law and default rules. The first implication is that arbitration jeopardizes mandatory rules of law. To preserve the mandatory effect of these rules, the Supreme Court must make a choice. The Court must either reverse its decisions that claims arising under otherwise mandatory rules are arbitrable, or require de novo judicial review of arbitrators' legal rulings on such claims. The second implication is that claims arising under default rules should be arbitrable and completely free from judicial review for errors of law. The arbitration of claims arising under default rules presents an opportunity to privatize the creation of vast areas of law. It is an opportunity to create private legal systems of unwritten norms, written rules, and the precedents of private courts.
Saturday, September 21, 2013
Arbitration and Unconscionability
Wake Forest Law Review.
This article advocates the contractual approach over competing approaches to issues of unconscionability in arbitration.
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