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Wednesday, July 25, 2018

Uber Class-Waiver Arbitration Agreement Unenforceable

The First Circuit recently held that an arbitration clause contained in the online contract of the ride sharing app, Uber Technologies, Inc., is unenforceable under Massachusetts law. Cullinane v. Uber Technologies, Inc., No. 16-2023 (1st Cir. June 25, 2018).

In this case, plaintiffs, Uber riders, filed a class action in Massachusetts state court, challenging certain fees Uber charged as violations of state consumer protection laws. Uber removed the case to federal court and moved to compel arbitration based on an arbitration clause in Uber’s Terms of Service. In order to use the Uber app, the customers had to register for an Uber account and to agree to the company’s Terms of Service & Privacy Policy. The Terms of Service included an arbitration clause which required customers to resolve any disputes with Uber through binding arbitration and also contained a class action waiver. The district court granted Uber’s motion to compel arbitration and dismissed the lawsuit. The plaintiffs appealled to the First Circuit.

As Jeanne Kohler of Carlton Fields writes, the First Circuit found that Uber had not reasonably communicated its Terms of Service, including the mandatory arbitration clause, to its customers because the link to the Terms was not sufficiently conspicuous. The Court noted that Uber did not use a common method of conspicuously informing online app users of its terms by requiring users to click a box stating that they agree to the terms before continuing to the next screen. Instead, Uber displayed, on an enrollment screen, a rectangular box with the language “Terms of Service,” which customers were not required to click in order to review the contract. The Court noted that Uber’s terms were not conspicuously disclosed to its users because the link was not designed in a way that most users associate with hyperlinks and thus did not have the appearance of a hyperlink. Further, the hyperlink box was not sufficiently distinct from the rest of the screen, which had other links in bold with similarly sized font that were “more noticeable.”

Thursday, July 19, 2018

Supreme Court to Decide Class Arbitration Case

Lamps Plus Inc. v. Varela, from the Ninth Circuit, concerns "Whether the Federal Arbitration Act forecloses a state-law interpretation of an arbitration agreement that would authorize class arbitration based solely on general language commonly used in arbitration agreements."

The US Chamber of Commerce wants the Ninth Circuit reversed. As Supreme Court has decided many recent arbitration cases along predictable political lines, and there was a dissent to the Ninth Circuit opinion including the famously progressive (late) Judge Reinhardt, such a reversal would fit the usual pattern. Public Citizen predictably opposes the Chamber on this case.

As John Lewis of BakerHostletler writes, "the district court interpreted the arbitration agreement to authorize class arbitration. A divided 9th Circuit panel affirmed. Judges Reinhardt and Wardlaw first distinguished Stolt-Nielsen S.A. v. AnimalFeeds Int’l Corp., 55 U.S. 662, 684 (2010). In Stolt-Nielsen, “silence” was “more than the mere absence of language explicitly referring to class arbitration; instead, it meant absence of agreement.” So, merely because an agreement does not expressly refer to class arbitration is not determinative according to the judges. The majority then applied California contract principles to interpret the arbitration agreement. They found the agreement was ambiguous as to class arbitration and construed it against the drafter, Lamps Plus."

Tuesday, July 3, 2018

Article Defending Some of the Supreme Court's Controversial Arbitration Decisions

A Short Defense of Southland, Casarotto, and Other Long-Controversial Arbitration Decisions, was just published in the Loyola Consumer Law Review.

The abstract follows:

Scalding criticism of Supreme Court arbitration decisions appeared in the 1990’s and is now widespread. Over twenty years ago, the Supreme Court held that pre-dispute arbitration clauses in adhesion contracts are generally enforceable. Thoughtful scholars then feared threats to consumers' and employees' rights, and today similarly warn that the Court’s recent arbitration decisions “will provide companies with free rein to commit fraud, torts, discrimination, and other harmful acts without fear of being sued.” Professors are not the only sources of strong language opposing the Court’s arbitration decisions. Under the heading “Forced Arbitration Destroys Individual Rights,” a 2015 federal court decision declares: “Today, forced arbitration bestrides the legal landscape like a colossus, effectively stamping out the individual’s statutory rights wherever inconvenient to the businesses which impose them. What is striking is that, other than the majority of the Supreme Court, whose questionable jurisprudence erected this legal monolith, no one thinks they got it right.”

From this alleged consensus of “No one thinks they got it right,” this Article dissents in significant part. While I have long opposed Supreme Court decisions on arbitration law’s separability doctrine and judicial review of arbitration awards, and would reduce adhesive arbitration agreements’ impact on class actions, I continue to sympathize with some of the Court’s long-controversial arbitration decisions.

I choose the word “sympathize” because I believe much of the criticism of the Court’s arbitration decisions does not sufficiently weigh the difficult position the Court was in when deciding those cases. The FAA was enacted in the 1920’s before the landmark federalism case of Erie v. Tompkins, the New Deal’s expansion of the Commerce Clause and thus of federal power to preempt state law, the growth of federal employment and consumer law in the 1960’s and 1970’s, and the ensuing explosion of class actions. Each of these enormous changes to our nation’s legal landscape conflicted with the premises underlying the FAA. While Congress could have amended the FAA to accommodate and be more consistent with these enormous changes, it did not. So, reconciling an old statute with a half century of law in tension with that statute’s premises became the Court’s task.

The Courts’ critics generally argue that the drafters and adopters of the FAA did not intend for it to: (1) preempt state law or (2) cover consumer and employment arbitration agreements. This Article responds to those arguments.